I examine a non-cooperative model of voluntary contribution to children's goods in a twoadult household, where both parents may have marginal rates of substitution across paternal, maternal and public contributions that differ from unity. I find a conflict of interest between women and their children. Depending on the marginal rate of substitution between paternal and maternal contributions, a lump-sum redistribution from fathers to mothers may make children better off, but their mothers worse off, or vice versa. Additional public contribution funded by a lump-sum tax on fathers may make children better off at the cost of mothers.
Introduction
There is a widespread presumption in the development policy discourse that redistribution of resources from husbands to wives is likely to improve the wellbeing of both married women and their children, and that there is a natural congruence of interests between mothers and their children, as against those of fathers. This presumption underlies the large-scale introduction of policies to redistribute income from fathers to mothers in many developing countries.
1 Yet the theoretical underpinnings of this presumption, typically derived from simple partial equilibrium models, are shaky. Attempts to redistribute resources from husbands to wives can end up making women worse off. This paradoxical consequence may occur, for example, when labor markets exhibit a two-tiered structure, as is typically the case in developing countries (Dasgupta 2000) , or when the redistributive mechanism reduces male incentives to work (Dasgupta 2001) . Furthermore, the interests of mothers and children might actually be in conflict: redistribution from fathers to mothers might improve the welfare of both children and fathers, but, ironically, make mothers themselves worse off. Thus, welfare consequences of policy attempts to redistribute income from men to their wives can be far more complicated than is commonly acknowledged.
2
A closer examination of the theoretical foundations underlying policy interventions to redistribute resources from fathers to mothers, and their connection to children's welfare, is therefore of critical importance. This paper offers such an examination that encompasses a neglected aspect, viz., culturally constructed differences in the valuation of paternal, maternal and communal (or public) contributions to children's consumption. I show that internalization of such differences by parents can have critical consequences for attempts to redistribute resources from fathers to mothers. Interests of mothers may be aligned with those of their husbands, but in conflict with those of their children. Redistribution may improve the well-being of children at the cost of both parents, or vice versa, depending on the exact nature of gendered differences in valuation of parental contributions. Likewise, greater communal contribution funded by a lump-sum tax on either parent can make children better off, but both parents 1 While I focus on developing countries, this presumption is common in developed countries as well. Changes in the U.K. child benefit scheme in the late '70s, replacing a tax deduction for the father by a cash payment to the mother, constitute an interesting example in a developed country context. This led to a redistribution of about 8% of average male earnings from fathers to mothers (Lundberg et al. 1997) . Routine examples of such interventions in developing countries in favor of women include changes in inheritance laws and property rights, gender-based hiring quotas and affirmative action in labor markets, training, marketing support and subsidized lending programs targeted towards women. India has even experimented with lower income tax rates for women. 2 See also Doepke and Tertilt (2011) for a rare theoretical acknowledgement of such complications. Their concerns are however very different from those analyzed in this paper. worse off. These conflicts are basic: they arise even in a simple partial equilibrium model of intra-household allocation with exogenous labor supply, which abstracts from labor market distortions and focuses on balanced-budget lump-sum redistributions.
Thus, welfare consequences of attempts at redistributing income from one spouse to another cannot be predicted without taking into account the exact nature of culturally constructed gendered differences in the valuation of parental and communal contributions prevalent in a society.
In most, arguably all, developing societies, normative emphasis is placed on the duty of parents to contribute to their children's well-being. As a parent, one's social standing is to a large degree dependent on the extent to which one is perceived by others as fulfilling this duty. Children are taught to valorize selfsacrifice for one's own children from an early age. Consequently, individuals come to internalize such a parental duty ethic before becoming parents. However, there are systematic gender-specific differences in the social construction of this parental duty ethic. In some societies, child bearing is considered constitutive of a woman's identity, but providing for children beyond early infancy is considered primarily the responsibility of the father. In other societies, child bearing and providing for them till they attain adulthood are both considered the primary normative responsibility of the mother. If individuals internalize these gendered asymmetries in social valorization of parental responsibility, they may be expected to value mothers' contributions and fathers' contributions differently when they themselves become parents, even though the contributions, being materially indistinguishable, impact identically on children's well-being in an objective sense. 3 In the first case, both parents may be expected to receive some psychic benefit if the father provides a greater proportion of children's consumption. The very act of greater paternal contribution might confer some direct benefit on the father, from a private sense of satisfaction and self-esteem at having conformed better to the socially valorized division of domestic responsibilities, and/or from the respect such conformity might command from others. Assuming, reasonably, that men and women internalize identical social values, for mothers, having to provide a higher share of children's expenses would generate a psychic loss, since women would resent having to perform a duty they do not consider rightly theirs, and evaluate their marriages according to 3 Children may conceivably perceive their own well-being through such a normative lens. In discussing children's welfare, my focus however is on the objective conditions, i.e. material inputs, facilitating children's development. Such a 'paternalistic' approach to children's wellbeing, involving assessment in terms of criteria that are independent of (and possibly contrary to) juvenile preferences, is routine in social policy. Governments invariably restrict children's legal rights to buy, sell, leave school, get married, or participate in the political process. Governments also routinely evaluate children's well-being independently of parental perception of such wellbeing, consequently restricting parents' rights over children. I shall accordingly identify children's welfare with their material consumption, not the sources of such consumption. the extent to which their husbands conform to socially prescribed paternal responsibilities. In the second case, both parents might receive a psychic benefit from the mother's act of contributing a higher share of children's consumption. In either case, both husbands and wives would perceive their spouse's contributions to children's consumption as imperfect substitutes for their own, even though these are materially indistinguishable. Thus, while an additional dollar spent on children's goods has the same material impact on children's welfare regardless of its source, the identity of its contributor would have a bearing on the self-perception of well-being on part of both parents. What impact would a balanced-budget lump-sum redistribution of income from fathers to mothers have on the welfare of different household members in such a context? An analogous question arises as soon as one notes that, typically, parents are not the only major source of contributions to child-rearing. The external 'community' within which the family is embedded contributes as well. The state typically provides direct support via subsidized or free provision of health and education facilities for children. In many countries, it also provides nutrition supplements through school meal programs. But support is not confined to the formal state apparatus. Looser forms of collectivity such as the village, the clan or the extended family also contribute to the rearing of children born to couples embedded in such collectivity. Yet 'communal' contribution, in this inclusive sense of both governmental and identity-group support, is, arguably, not perceived as normatively indistinguishable from parental support. Typically, social norms appear to valorize parental contribution over such communal contribution, in that the primary responsibility for looking after children is seen as lying with the parents. To the extent that parents internalize these norms, they may be expected to value a dollar of own contribution to children's upkeep more than a dollar of communal contribution. 4 What impact then, would an increase in communal contribution, funded by a balanced-budget lump-sum tax on either parent, have on the distribution of consumption (and thus welfare) inside the household?
In traditional analyses, where spouses consider each other's, and external (communal), contributions perfect substitutes, the answer, typically, is 'none'. Non-cooperative models of voluntary contribution to children's goods predict that, in case of a redistribution from the father to the mother, the former would reduce his contribution by exactly the amount lost, while the latter would compensate by increasing hers by the same amount. Hence all household members would find their consumption unchanged. 5 An increase in communal 4 It is routinely observed for welfare transfers that individuals may feel stigmatized or 'ashamed' when receiving 'charitable' transfers and, consequently, value a dollar of 'earned' income more than a dollar of welfare (see Breunig and Dasgupta 2003 and the references therein). 5 See Dasgupta (2001) . Contributions include Breunig and Dasgupta (2005) , Chen and Woolley (2001) , Dasgupta (2001) , Konrad and Lommerud (1995) , and Lundberg and Pollak (1993) . Costs spending on children funded by a balanced-budget lump-sum tax on either parent would likewise leave consumption invariant. The standard, pure public goods, model thus implies complete crowding out (and hence policy ineffectiveness). An identical neutrality follows from Becker's (1981) model of pure altruism on part of a parent. However, when individuals consider their spouses', and other people's, contributions imperfect substitutes for their own, a priori, the answer is not at all intuitively clear. One may expect the father to cut down his contribution to children's expenses by some amount, say x, in response to a loss of one dollar of his own income. When the mother gains one dollar of own income, whether she perceives herself better off would depend on her valuation of the cutback in children's spending on part of her husband. As discussed earlier, depending on internalized social norms, she may perceive x dollars of contribution by her husband as better or worse than x dollars contributed from her own earnings. Consequently, the redistribution need not necessarily make the mother better off in her own perception. The impact on total provision of children's goods, and thus, their welfare, becomes likewise non-obvious. The problem is analogous when both parents value communal contributions less than parental contribution. A large empirical literature supports my intuitive starting point, that individuals do not perceive children's goods provision from different sources as perfect substitutes. Econometric investigations almost universally reject complete crowding out of charitable donations (see Andreoni and Payne 2011 , Ribar and Wilhelm 2002 , Payne 1998 ): they find a dollar increase in government grants to non-profit firms reduces private contributions by much less. Crowding out is incomplete in experimental settings as well (e.g. Andreoni 1993) . Investigations of the impact of private income gains or tax-funded welfare transfers on voluntary of negotiating and enforcing intra-household agreements motivate the choice of the noncooperative model over the cooperative bargaining one. See Konrad and Lommerud (1995) for an extensive justification along these lines. Udry (1996) offers evidence against the assumption, central to cooperative bargaining models, of efficient intra-household decision-making. The phenomenon of domestic violence common in (but certainly not exclusive to) developing societies also intuitively militates against the assumption of efficient intra-household decision-making. The redistribution would be non-neutral in the analytically trivial, and empirically implausible, case of a corner solution: it would make both the wife and the children better off if the husband was spending nothing on children's goods initially, it would make the children worse off if the wife was contributing nothing initially. The standard intuition would thus be vindicated in the first case, but not in the second if the policy objective is to improve children's well-being. Thus, the standard intuition is dependent on the prior assumption that men spend nothing on common household expenses. This is implausible in many empirical contexts, especially those where male earnings and labor market participation rates are significantly higher than those of their wives. Nor is it clear why women would choose to stay in marriages characterized by such complete freeriding on the part of men: they gain nothing from doing so. If men and women contribute to different domestic public goods, the redistribution will necessarily make women better off, but children may be worse off as a consequence of fathers reducing their public good contributions. income transfers within the household similarly find crowding out to be far from complete.
6 These findings are all consistent with an impure altruism model of giving, where individuals receive some private benefits (possibly a psychic 'warm glow') from the act of giving per se, and consequently value their own contributions more than others'. Differential valuation of contributions to children's expenses according to source is also consistent with what behavioral economists term 'mental accounting'. Mental accounting implies income is not fungible across different sources: people assign certain expenditure activities, implicitly or explicitly, to specific 'mental' accounts funded by different sources of income. Thus, changes in income or wealth in one mental account, such as a windfall, are not perfect substitutes for income changes in another account, such as wages for labor (Thaler 1999 ). An extension of this idea to intra-household allocation suggests that own earnings, spousal contributions to common household expenses and public support for children's expenses need not be perceived as perfect substitutes. There is indeed a growing body of micro evidence which supports this view, by suggesting that household expenditure patterns are significantly influenced by the source and composition of income.
7
Violations of the complete crowding out hypothesis has long since led to a general acknowledgement in the literature on voluntary giving and intergenerational transfers that the pure public good formulation needs to be replaced by an impure public goods one, where agents value own contributions differently from those by others. However, this literature has not addressed the 6 Altonji et al. (1997) find that shifting one dollar in current income from donor parents to recipient adult offspring leads to less than a 13-cent decrease in parents' transfer to the latter. Altonji et al. (1992) find the distribution of consumption of food between parents and children highly dependent on the distribution of income inside the extended family. Cox and Jimenez (1992) , analyzing Peruvian data, find that social security transfers to the elderly funded by a tax on the young leads to much less than complete crowding out of voluntary transfers from the latter to the former. Jensen (2003) reports similar findings for South Africa. Quisumbing (2003) surveys the large body of empirical evidence from developing countries that suggests income redistribution from husbands to wives is likely to be non-neutral: in particular, it is likely to increase household spending on children's goods. Lundberg et al. (1997) find evidence of a redistribution from husbands to wives increasing children's consumption for the UK. 7 Jacoby (2002) finds an intra-household 'fly-paper effect' (whereby commodity transfers targeted to a child largely 'stick', increasing the child's consumption more than an equivalent increase in parental income) in a school feeding program in the Philippines. Using Dutch data, Kooreman (2000) finds the marginal propensity to consume a child good, clothing, out of exogenous child (cash) benefits to be much larger than the marginal propensity to consume child clothing out of other income. Hoffman (2009) offers experimental evidence from Uganda that children five years of age or younger are significantly more likely to use insecticide treated mosquito nets when their parents are given free mosquito nets, rather than cash transfers. Villa et al. (2011) find differential dietary responses across income sources among East African pastoralists; Duflo and Udry (2004) likewise perceive mental accounting in the expenditure patterns of households in Cote d'Ivoire.
implications, of possible social construction of systematic differences across genders in the extent of such warm glow, for intra-household redistribution.
The present paper redresses this lacuna. I set up a Cournot model of voluntary contributions to children's goods in a two-adult household, where parental incomes and communal contribution are exogenously given, and spouses may have marginal rates of substitution between paternal, maternal and communal contributions that differ from unity. I assume that social norms are internalized in a gender-neutral manner, so that husbands and wives have identical relative valuations for paternal, maternal and communal contributions. I consider the welfare implications of a marginal (balanced-budget) redistribution from the husband to the wife when both contribute positive amounts to children's consumption. I also consider the consequences of a marginal rise in communal provision, funded by a (balanced-budget) lump-sum tax on either parent. I show that a conflict may exist between the interests of parents and those of children. When maternal contributions are valued less than paternal contributions, redistribution from the father to the mother increases total spending on children. Thus, children are better off. However, despite total household income remaining invariant, both parents are worse off; in terms of private consumption as well as welfare. The opposite holds when paternal contributions are valued less than maternal contributions. If parental contributions are valued more than communal contributions, a rise in communal provision funded by a lump-sum tax on either parent makes children better off, but both parents worse off. Thus, contrary to the common perception, there may exist a unity of interests between parents, and a conflict between parents and their children. Social policy may need to take cognizance of this conflict. The impact, on children's well-being, of a relative rise in maternal incomes cannot be predicted without taking into account relative social valuation of paternal, maternal and communal contributions. Redistributions that acquire broad political support may be those that hurt children: greater communal contribution may dominate greater parental provision from the children's perspective, but would nevertheless be opposed by parents.
Conflict of interest between non-contributors (children) and contributors (parents) sharply demarcates my analysis from earlier analogous contributions to the general literature on voluntary contributions to a public good. My analysis has a structural analogy with models of voluntary contribution to a pure public good where contributors differ in the marginal productivity of their contributions (Ihori 1996, Konrad and Lommerund 1995) . However, objective differences in productivity and subjective differences in valuation intuitively address very different phenomena. Furthermore, in the former case, a lump-sum redistribution from a less productive contributor to a more productive one makes both parties better off, by increasing total provision of the public good. In my model, a lumpsum redistribution from the low valuation parent to the high valuation one similarly makes both parents better off, but, in sharp contrast, reduces the material amount of the intra-household public good, making children worse off. Thus, my focus on differences in subjective valuation of contributions that are materially identical leads to predictions about the equilibrium material magnitude of the domestic public good that directly contradict the predictions of a model of pure public good provision with differing marginal productivities. Ihori (1992) considers an impure public goods model, but focuses on the welfare implications of income redistribution exclusively for contributors. My application of this general framework differs from Ihori (1992) both in my specific intra-household focus and in my explicit concentration on how income redistribution among contributors (parents) impacts on the welfare of non-contributors (children).
Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 presents the central results. Section 4 discusses how the model may be extended to permit communal contributions to parental private consumption, domestic labor and differential internalization of social norms across genders. I conclude in Section 5.
The Model
A household consists of two parents, M (mother) and F (father), and children. Each parent derives utility from a private good and a good consumed by children, some of which may be provided by the community ( ℑ ). For
, let k x denote private consumption and y the total amount of the children's good, while k k y y − , and T will denote the amounts of the children's good provided, respectively, by k, the other parent and ℑ ; T y y y k k
. Given communal provision (T), M and F simultaneously allocate their income between private consumption and children's expenditure.
For parent
, preferences are given by a strictly quasi-concave and twice-differentiable utility function
where
. Thus, I allow (without assuming) the possibility that paternal and maternal preferences differ:
need not exhibit identical functional forms. The parameter k θ measures the extent to which parent k considers her own contribution to children's expenses a substitute for her spouse's contribution. It is the marginal rate of substitution between the other parent's contribution and her own. Given her private consumption and communal provision, a unit increase in the other parent's contribution would leave k 's utility unchanged if, and only if, her own contribution were to be reduced by k 
, while providing an intuitively transparent and algebraically convenient sufficiency condition, is not necessary to generate my conclusions, as summarized below in Observation 1 and Proposition 1. I postpone a discussion of this to Section 4.2. In standard formulations, parents are assumed to value all contributions equally, so that, given private consumption, only the total amount of children's consumption is relevant for their welfare. This, the so-called pure public good case, is a special case in my analysis, where
. The public good may also be 'impure': agents may perceive, and value, paternal, maternal and communal contributions differently. In this case, where
, or both, the total amount of the public good and the distribution of contributions both become relevant for a parent's perception of her well-being.
, given total consumption of every good, both parents receive additional benefit if M provides more of the public good. The act of contributing itself provides direct personal benefit to M, as in standard models of 'warm glow' giving (e.g. Dasgupta and Kanbur 2011 and 2007 , Cornes and Sandler 1994 , Andreoni 1990 ). However, unlike such models, this 'warm glow' is not confined to the contributor alone. Here, the natural interpretation is in terms of personal satisfaction and social esteem acquired by being in a marriage where the division of responsibilities conforms to socially prescribed and valorized gender roles, perceived as natural 'duties' both by oneself and others. Thus, 1 , < M M τ θ models the case where both men and women perceive it the natural duty of women (not their husbands, nor the community) to be the principal provider for their children, and evaluate marriages according to the extent to which the wife fulfills this role. Consequently, not fulfilling or conforming to this role generates feelings of guilt, shame and self-loathing in women, as well as a loss of social esteem. The husband also suffers a welfare loss if his wife's contribution is replaced by his own, or by communal, contribution. I interpret the first case in terms of a sense of resentment at: (i) having to perform a role that one does not perceive as one's natural duty, and (ii) being considered an object of pity by others for that reason. In the second case, the intuitive interpretation is that of feelings of guilt, shame and resentment at having to depend on 'charity' for the up-keep of one's children, instead of one's wife. Analogously, 1 , < F F τ θ models the case where providing for children is primarily the responsibility of fathers.
For notational simplicity, I shall assume all prices to be unity. Then, for all
Max , , subject to:
Eqn. (1) is the budget constraint; (2) is the requirement that no parent can divert the other's, nor the community's, contribution to her own private consumption. The solution to the optimization problem above, subject to the budget constraint (1) alone, yields the unrestricted demand functions:
( )
Notice that, by A1, we must have:
I shall assume that both goods are (strongly) normal. Thus, noting (4), I assume:
A2 ensures the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (see Andreoni 1990) . I assume both parents contribute positive amounts to children's expenses in equilibrium, so that (2) does not bind. Hence, (3)-(4) must hold. The solution to the equation pair for the unrestricted private demand functions specified by (3) yields the equilibrium levels of private parental consumption, and thus parental contributions, given the parameters
and M τ (recall A1).
The measure of children's welfare is their total equilibrium consumption (footnote 3). I now specify a measure of parental welfare. For
where k V is the indirect utility function corresponding to k u and the superscript * represents the equilibrium value of the relevant variable. Then, we can define:
Thus, * k r is parent k's real income in equilibrium. It is the amount of money that k would need to achieve the utility that she actually receives, if both the other parent and the community were to stop contributing entirely. Clearly, k is better off in some equilibrium rather than another if, and only if, her real income is higher in the former. Since, by assumption, (2) does not bind, (1) and (6) imply:
Since equilibrium parental utility is monotonically increasing in parental real income, the direction of change in parental welfare is the same as that in parental real income. In my welfare analysis, I shall be concerned only with the direction of change, not its magnitude. Hence, focusing on the direction of changes in real income will prove both necessary and sufficient to predict the direction of policyinduced changes in parental utility (holding the preference parameters
). I shall analyze such changes in Section 3 below. Notice however that, by A2 and (7), parental private consumption is a positive function of real income. Thus, one can equivalently identify parental welfare with parental private consumption, instead of real income, when parental preferences remain invariant.
In the rest of this section, I shall discuss the consequences of considering others' contributions to child-rearing an imperfect substitute for one's own, a prescriptive social norm that appears pervasive, especially in traditional societies. This would improve children's consumption, but reduce private consumption of both parents. Thus, social norms, to be optimal for children, must involve overvalorization of paternal contribution relative to communal contribution
Equal valuation of paternal and maternal contributions ( 1 = F θ ) does not, in general, maximize children's consumption. Observation 1 therefore leads one to speculate that normative under-valuation of communal contribution to childrearing relative to parental contribution, and differential valorization of paternal and maternal contributions, may both serve to enhance children's survival prospects, and thus the long-term population growth rate. These functions conceivably provide one clue to the pervasive presence of such norms. Observation 1 suggests that a community which differentially valorizes paternal and maternal contributions, and under-valorizes communal contribution, may invest more resources in its children than another with an identical population size, demographic structure and economic base, which perceives all contributions identically. Consequently, the first community may achieve an evolutionary advantage: it may end up with a higher proportion of surviving children, who may also be better fed and trained. Consequently, the first community may acquire a larger, healthier and better trained adult population in the next generation. This reproductive advantage would expand over generations, eventually allowing the first community to overwhelm the second both in terms of relative population size and productive base. Competition over resources would then see the first community increasingly marginalize and perhaps eventually destroy the second, unless the latter adopts the differential valorization norms of the former.
When external agencies alter relative weights put on paternal and maternal contributions, it may be thought that attempts to measure parental welfare consequences face the standard problem of non-comparability when utility functions change. This is not so. By Observation 1(i), if parents come to consider F's contribution a better substitute for M's ( F θ falls), F must increase his own contribution, while M must decrease hers. Then M is better off in the new equilibrium, according to both her initial and altered (higher M θ ) preferences. F is worse off in the new equilibrium, according to both his initial (higher F θ ) and altered preferences. This agreement ceases to hold for a change in relative valuation of communal contribution. Observation 1(ii) implies that a rise in the relative valuation of communal contribution, by reducing parental contributions, makes each parent worse off in terms of their initial preferences, though they are both better off in terms of their altered preferences (higher k τ ). An alternative, 'objective' and 'non-welfarist', approach to measuring parental well-being is to identify well-being with private consumption. This is implicitly suggested by standard arguments that women's perceptions regarding their own well-being in traditional societies need not be accepted at face value for normative prescriptions, since they are culturally conditioned to under-value their own interests. Observation 1 implies that the welfarist and private consumption approaches to measuring parental well-being agree both for a change in F θ , and for a change in F τ if final preferences are considered normatively valid. The two conflict only when F τ changes and initial preferences are considered valid.
Low M θ benefits fathers (and, possibly, children) at the cost of mothers.
This suggests a contradiction in patriarchal values. High M θ (i.e., ) 1 > M θ seems commensurate with a general social over-valuation of men. Yet such overvaluation is also costly for men. Conversely, a low M θ benefits men, but might be difficult to square with inflated notions of male importance. In practice, one often observes an uneasy co-existence of cultural notions of male superiority with intense valorization of an ethic of maternal self-sacrifice in strongly patriarchal societies. The cult of the Madonna in Latin countries, and that of the mothergoddess in India, both suggest themselves as immediate examples. Observation 1(i) offers a possible interpretation for this tension. It follows that societies may under-value paternal contributions despite being strongly patriarchal. Observation 1(i) suggests that attempts to alter social values so that women become willing to trade off a greater amount of their own contribution, in exchange for an additional unit of their husbands' contribution, may also shift the intra-household distribution of resources towards women. Encouragement of such alteration in social values (cultural contestation of a prevalent 'Madonna' ethic of maternal self-sacrifice, which undervalues paternal contribution) would thus be reasonable if the objective is to increase private consumption of mothers. Attempts at social engineering via over-valorization of paternal contribution relative to maternal contribution (lowering of F θ below unity) may therefore benefit mothers. This shift would come at the cost of reduced consumption by fathers and, possibly, children. Norms that emphasize one's parental duty to provide for one's children, and stigmatize recourse to communal support, may serve to increase the consumption of children while reducing that of parents (Observation 1(ii)). Thus, cultural celebration of such a parental duty ethic (which stigmatizes recourse to, and thereby undervalues, communal contribution) would be reasonable if the objective is to increase children's consumption. By Observation 1(ii), a rise in the relative valuation of communal contributions, by reducing parental contributions, makes children worse off; but also makes each parent worse off in terms of their initial preferences. This provides one possible clue to the persistence of low relative valuation of communal contributions. I have argued that such norms may provide a reproductive edge to communities which follow them. By the same token, they also involve an inter-generational conflict: higher consumption by children implies lower consumption by parents. Nevertheless, this conflict need not be subjectively perceived by individual parents as such. Each parent stands to lose (on the basis of her current preferences) if her spouse unilaterally increases his valuation of communal contribution and, consequently, reduces his contribution. Each parent therefore has an incentive, on the basis of her current preferences, to oppose third party attempts to argue for a lower valuation of parental contributions, relative to communal contributions. Hence, third-party attempts to contest the over-valuation of parental contributions, relative to communal contributions, may not receive adequate political support from individual parents.
It is useful to illustrate the model now with an example. Consider the case where 
where ( )
is the preference parameter reflecting the relative weight on private consumption. Together, (1) and (8) imply, in equilibrium, for
( ) ( )
Using (9), I get closed form solutions for individual contributions:
Using (8), (10) and (11), I then get equilibrium consumption levels of all goods:
. (14) Furthermore, (7), (8), (13) and (14) yield parental real incomes:
. (16) Eqn. (12), (15) and (16) is maximized at some F θ greater than unity. Hence, a rise in the relative valuation of paternal contribution, while making mothers better off and fathers worse off (Observation 1(i)), may also make children worse off in this case.
Redistribution
How does a balanced-budget lump-sum redistribution from fathers to their wives affect the welfare of household members? Would such redistribution necessarily benefit mothers or their children? How do gender-specific differences in the valuation of contributions mediate the welfare consequences of redistribution? Analogously, how does a unit increase in communal provision funded by a lumpsum unit tax on either parent impact on intra-household allocation? I now proceed to address these issues. One can also interpret my questions in terms of a situation where the state has some given amount, say, a dollar, and has to decide whether to transfer this amount to M or F directly as a lump-sum increment in market income, or, indirectly, as an additional dollar of children's goods. The mechanism driving these findings is the following. In response to a loss of one dollar to M, F will reduce his contribution to children's expenses by some amount. The lower the value of F θ , the lower the consequent net gain in real income to M, and therefore, the lower the increase in her private consumption. The positive impact on public good provision by M is therefore greater, the lower the value of F θ . The lower the value of F θ , the greater the net real income loss to F; hence the lower his private consumption, and thus, the lower his reduction in public good provision. Therefore, the redistribution from F to M will increase total equilibrium public good provision when 1 < F θ . However, as already noted, the higher the valuation of F's contribution by M, i.e., the lower the value of F θ , the greater the loss imposed on M by a given cutback in contribution by F. When 1 < F θ , the net effect is a fall in M's private consumption (and welfare), despite (indeed, because of) an increase in total children's consumption, and despite M being better off in monetary terms. F is also worse off due to his low valuation of his wife's additional contribution, relative to his own. The consequences are reversed when 1 > F θ . The intuitive explanation when collective provision replaces parental provision is analogous. Thus, under normative over-valuation of parental contribution relative to communal contribution, from the children's perspective, a shift to communal provision dominates parental provision, while communal provision is the worst alternative for either parent. By Proposition 1(i), when 1 < F θ , a marginal redistribution from F to M makes both parents worse off. Would the redistribution then be completely negated by a voluntary reverse transfer from M to F? If so, the complete crowding out hypothesis, a la Becker (1981) , would hold. However, as discussed earlier, empirical studies overwhelmingly reject this hypothesis (footnotes 6 and 7), and a large literature finds income redistribution between spouses to be nonneutral. The kind of mental accounting considerations that motivate my analysis also provide grounds to reject any a priori presumption of full neutrality. It is well-known in the mental accounting literature that individuals often treat windfall and labor incomes differently. Analogously, a voluntary cash transfer from M to F is unlikely to be perceived as F's 'earned', and thus his 'own', income, by either spouse. Both seem more likely to perceive this as M's discretionary contribution to the domestic public good, and thus earmarked for spending on that account. The original increase in M's market earnings brought about by the state, through an indirect, contingent, and complicated process of generalized pro-female tax-subsidy intervention over which an individual husband has no say or discretionary control, is however much more likely to be perceived as M's 'own' income by both spouses. My analysis thus provides theoretical reasons to expect cross-gender political opposition to broad interventions seeking to redistribute market earnings from husbands to wives (or target incremental earning gains towards wives rather than husbands) when social norms undervalue maternal contributions (or maternal market incomes), and thus admits the possibility of complete collective roll-back mediated through the political process. However, in line with a large body of empirical evidence, it admits only partial individual roll-back through compensating changes in voluntary transfers between spouses. Analogous considerations apply when social norms undervalue paternal contributions (or paternal market incomes). Notice also that, if spousal voluntary transfers were considered identical to own market income, then, in a world with endogenous labor supply, an obvious moral hazard problem may arise: when 1 < F θ , F has an incentive to increase his leisure consumption, thereby deliberately reducing his own market income, to induce a greater transfer from his wife. The resultant inefficiency can make M worse off, compared to the equilibrium with no side payments. This is a variant of the 'Samaritan's Dilemma' (Buchanan 1975) . Social norms and mental accounting practices which generate differential perception and valuation of own market income and spousal transfers, or moral injunctions against accepting 'spousal charity', can be seen to reduce this moral hazard problem and its consequent inefficiency. Analogous functions may be served by injunctions against receiving public charity.
Proposition 1(ii) rationalizes the large literature which suggests tax financed public transfers to specific household members may be only partially offset by reductions in voluntary transfers by those members who bear the tax burden (footnotes 6 and 7). In line with my theoretical analysis, these studies provide empirical grounds for expecting an increase in communal spending on children, funded by a lump-sum tax on parents, to make the former better off.
Extensions
I now proceed to discuss some possible generalizations of the benchmark model developed in Sections 2 and 3.
Communal Contribution to Parental Private Consumption
Women sometimes receive private consumption support, as commodity transfers, from the community. Typical examples in developing country contexts include free or subsidized food, health and (adult) education facilities. Suppose therefore that the community provides a private consumption supplement, k P , to parent k .
The utility function can now be generalized to ( )
, private consumption from own income is perceived as identical to private consumption provided by the community. Then, so long as M spends a positive amount on her private consumption, the commodity transfer is identical, in its impact on equilibrium allocation, to an equivalent earning gain by her. But when 1 < k η , k receives greater utility if a dollar of communally provided private consumption is replaced by a dollar of private consumption purchased from own earnings. It is easy to check that, given A1-A2 and an interior solution to k's optimization problem, the following must now hold. When 1 < M η , a marginal increase in communal provision of M's private consumption, funded by a lump-sum tax on her, must reduce F's private consumption, while increasing total private consumption (
) by M. In real income terms, both parents must be worse off. Thus, β is the preference parameter. It follows from Proposition 1 that, in general, it is Paretoinefficient to use resources raised from a lump-sum tax on F for providing communal consumption support to M. If the policy objective is to increase children's consumption, this can be best met by using the tax revenue to provide direct communal consumption support to children. If it is to increase women's private consumption, this can be met by a direct earnings redistribution from F to M when 1 > F θ , and, paradoxically, by a reverse redistribution from M to F when 1 < F θ . In both cases, earnings redistribution makes M better off both in terms of private consumption and welfare. Communal support to M's private consumption instead of an earning increment to her does increase her private consumption, but reduces her welfare, i.e., makes her worse off in her own perception, when there is some cultural opprobrium attached to receiving communal 'charity'.
Differential Internalization of Norms
A1, while sufficient, is not necessary to generate my conclusions. Since all relevant functions are continuous, Observation 1 and Proposition 1 hold for 'small' departures from A1.
'Small' departures appear a reasonable approximation for reality: social norms, for salience, must involve general adoption. Even striking departures from A1 may be consistent with my contention: a possible conflict between mothers and children. Indeed, this may occur even if parents over/under-value each other's contributions. Then parental interests may come into conflict as well, unlike the congruence for 'small' departures from A1. In the examples below, congruence within, but conflict across, generations occurs when parents agree on whether paternal or maternal contributions are to be over-valued, thus sharing norms in this qualitative sense, though they disagree on the degree of over-valuation, thereby departing from A1.
Consider the identical and homothetic preferences case laid out earlier in Section 2. By (16), a marginal lump-sum redistribution from F to M will increase (resp. decrease) the real income of M in this case if, and only if,
. By (15), it will increase (resp. decrease) the real income of F if, and only if,
. By (12), it will make children better (resp. worse) off if, and only if, 
Domestic Labor
The model can be reinterpreted in terms of contributions of domestic labor. Suppose each parent is endowed with one unit of labor, which they can either sell for a wage w , or use for child-rearing. Then k y is k's (time) contribution to child rearing, T the communal time contribution, and k's problem is: , as in Section 2. This formulation is practically identical to the one in Section 2 and yields identical conclusions regarding the impact of lump-sum monetary redistributions from F to M. Redistributions which make both parents better (resp. worse) off will reduce (resp. increase) total time spent on child-rearing. Let children's objective well-being be given by some measure ( )
. When 1 > F θ , the fall in F's time contribution in response to a loss of income to M will be more than the rise in M's contribution. If paternal and maternal contributions are objectively equivalent (or the former more valuable) in their impact on a child's well-being (i.e. children's welfare is given by ( )
, then children will be worse off. Children may be worse off even if the marginal product of maternal time contribution is higher than that of fathers ( 1 < κ ). For example, if paternal contribution falls by 0.5 unit and maternal contribution rises by 0.25, then, assuming constant marginal products, children will be worse off unless mothers are at least twice as productive in generating well-being for children. Similar examples can be constructed even if the marginal rate of substitution between parental and maternal contributions varies. As paternal contribution falls, one can always define, by suitably choosing the (possibly variable) marginal rate of substitution between paternal and maternal contributions, forms of W according to which children would be worse off.
One may even permit parents to contribute both time and money without substantively changing either the model or its conclusions. Suppose parents derive utility from contributing both money and time to child rearing. Let 
]; and (ii) the nonnegativity constraints for contributions of both time and
. So long as both agents are interior in both time and monetary contributions, the demand for private consumption k x , as well as those for monetary and time contributions, can be expressed as functions of real income k z . Assuming that
are all increasing in k z (the analogue of A2), this extended model can be developed broadly along the lines identified in Sections 2 and 3. Observation 1 and Proposition 1 both hold in this setting, provided children's consumption is measured by its total market value C. Thus, when 1 > F θ , a marginal lump-sum monetary redistribution from F to M will benefit both parents, but reduce C. Evidently, this means either total time allocation or total monetary allocation must fall; both may possibly fall. If both fall, and children's objective well-being is given by some function
, increasing in its arguments, children must be worse off. Since at least one argument must fall, one can always (by suitably defining the, possibly variable, marginal rate of substitution between time and money) construct forms of W, according to which children would be worse off. Thus, even in this general case the possibility of a conflict across generations cannot be eliminated. Similar considerations apply to differences in productivity between paternal and maternal contributions. The model can be made even richer by permitting k θ to differ between monetary and time contributions, reflecting possible differences in social (and internalized) perception of domestic comparative advantage along traditional gender lines.
Concluding Remarks
An influential strand of development policy emphasizes measures to redistribute income from husbands to wives. Sometimes the justification offered is their presumed beneficial impact on the welfare of mothers, at other times it is their presumed beneficial impact on the welfare of children. Typically there is a further presumption regarding congruence of interests between women and children, in opposition to those of men. As this paper has shown, none of these presumptions is beyond question: important caveats may in fact be necessary in every case.
Expanding a theme initiated in Dasgupta (2001 Dasgupta ( , 2000 , I have shown that the impact of measures to redistribute income from fathers to mothers is critically contingent on structural features of a society. These include internalized cultural norms that put differential emphases on paternal and maternal contributions to child-rearing. Redistribution towards mothers is likely to increase children's consumption if maternal contributions are valued less than paternal contributions. One expects this to obtain in societies that consider providing for children primarily a paternal responsibility. In such societies, however, the redistribution may reduce the personal consumption (and welfare) of mothers, despite their receiving income increments. Fathers may likewise be worse off. Redistribution towards mothers is likely to reduce the welfare of children in societies that valorize maternal contributions over paternal contributions. There, mothers are likely to achieve a personal consumption (and welfare) improvement from the redistribution. So would fathers, despite losing financially. There may thus exist, in either case, a 'parents or child' trade-off, instead of the standard 'mother and child' conflation. In determining whether to advocate redistribution from fathers to mothers, one has to: (i) clarify whether the intended beneficiaries are conceived primarily as the mothers themselves or their children, and (ii) identify the relative weights put on paternal and maternal contributions in the relevant cultural milieu.
I have also shown that, given social stigmatization of parental dependence on communal contribution to children's upkeep, greater communal provision of children's goods, funded by a lump-sum tax on parents, may expand children's consumption. Thus, greater communal provision may dominate parental provision from the children's perspective, while the opposite is true from that of parents. Hence, my results question the logic of policy interventions to transfer resources to mothers with the objective of improving the well-being of children.
The possibility of a conflict between the interests of parents and those of children, highlighted in this paper, raises interesting questions regarding the political feasibility of pro-child interventions. My results suggest that politically popular redistribution proposals may sometimes be those that hurt children. Tax cuts for parents, funded by reduced state provision for children, are likely to be popular with parents, but may reduce children's consumption. Weakening of informal institutions of communal governance, such as tribal and clan councils, may likewise have a negative impact on children. Pro-child interventions may be politically more feasible in developing countries with weak democratic institutions or a single dominant party, governed by elites who prioritize long-term human capital investment. Where governments are susceptible to electoral pressure, domestically non-accountable agents (foreign donors and large private charities) may be more likely to implement effective pro-child transfer policies than the state. Rigorous investigation of these conjectures would prove useful. Application of the framework developed here to specific policy contexts constitutes another useful line of future research. Empirical measurement of the extent to which, in alternative cultural contexts, (i) a relative increase in maternal market earnings crowds out paternal contributions to children's expenses, and (ii) greater public contribution crowds out parental contribution, is also in order.
(iii) Part (iii) follows from A2, the budget constraint (1) and (7). 
